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Honor Thy Mother?: The Supreme Court’s
Jurisprudence of Motherhood
Laura Oren∗
The United States Supreme Court has spoken more directly about what
it means to be a father,1 than about what it means to be a mother. It has
considered issues relating to women’s physical and social reproductive
roles in four major areas: comparative family relationships (unwed mothers
versus unwed fathers), dependent mothers, mothers in the workplace, and
the right to choose or refuse to become a mother. In the first set of cases,
the Court has come a long way since the 1970s toward recognizing the
rights of unwed fathers to establish or protect family relationships, but it
still differentiates between them and mothers.2 In this arena, the Court
equates motherhood with automatic “caring,” in contrast to fatherhood. As
much as this sounds like valuing motherhood, it is simply another way to
say that biology equals destiny. The positive stereotypes, moreover,
swiftly give way in the second area.3 When the Court considers dependent
unmarried motherhood, it assumes that poor women cannot be trusted to
care for their children properly. Thus, all kinds of coercive and
manipulative measures imposed on poor women in the name of public
policy are acceptable. In the third sphere, the Court clearly affords
working mothers more respect today than it did before the 1970s.4
∗

Laura Oren is Law Foundation Professor at the University of Houston Law Center.
The University of Houston Law Foundation has provided financial assistance for this
project. Portions of this article were presented at “Twenty-first Century Motherhood:
Change,” a conference sponsored by the University of Houston Women’s Studies Program,
October 20-22, 2005.
This Article is dedicated to my mother, Grace Oren, and to my spouse, Bruce Palmer,
who has made it possible for me to care for her.
1. See generally Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the
Constitution: Biology ‘Plus’ Defines Relationships: Biology Alone Safeguards the Public
Fisc. 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47 (2004). [hereinafter Oren, Paradox].
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
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The Court has rejected older eugenicist ideas about the “mother of the
race” in favor of accepting women in the work place on equal terms. This
view, however, also has its problems. With the exception of a case
upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act,5 it is founded on the
assumption that motherhood is acceptable only when it does not interfere or
can be treated as a neutral factor in the work place. Finally, with respect to
the right to refuse or to choose motherhood, the Court recognized this as a
fundamental right in 1973.6 Almost immediately thereafter, however, it
also ruled that government need not equip women with the resources
necessary to make the choice in good health. That combination of rulings
did not honor motherhood by choice. Moreover, even the underlying
liberty interest may be at risk today.
Instead of offering a coherent legal analysis of these selective aspects
of motherhood, the Court has treated them as unrelated. Instead of
grappling with women’s complex experience of motherhood or
acknowledging how sex, class and race matter in this regard, the Court too
often has reduced its analysis to simple assumptions about generic
“Motherhood.” Despite some positive developments and much lip service,
the Court’s jurisprudence of motherhood fails to follow one of the
fundamental precepts of our culture, “Honor Thy Mother.”7
5. Nevada Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728-32 (2003) (ruling
that state employees may receive money damages for violations of the Family and Medical
Leave Act because it was enacted in valid reliance on Congressional power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment to ban gender-based discrimination in the workplace).
6. See infra Part IV.
7. The Judeo-Christian Bible provides in the Fifth Commandment, “Honor thy father
and thy mother; that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.”
Exodus 20:12. In post-revolutionary times, honoring motherhood became an important
political precept. The ideals of “Republican Motherhood,” a term coined by historian LINDA
KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
(1980), meant that women played an important role in educating their sons in the civic
virtue necessary for the survival and success of the new nation. As a result, women’s
education became an important issue at this time. Thereafter, many famous Americans
attributed their success to their mothers. For example, the following quotation has been
attributed to George Washington (1732-1799): “My mother was the most beautiful woman I
ever saw. All I am I owe to my mother. I attribute all my success in life to the moral,
intellectual and physical education I received from her.” – George Washington (1732-1799).
Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) echoed the sentiment: “All that I am or ever hope to be, I
owe to my angel Mother.”
Stock Solution, Tribute to Motherhood,
http://www.xmission.com/~tssphoto/mom/trib.html (last visited February 9, 2006).
The celebration of Mother’s Day is the commercial apotheosis of this precept. Anna Jarvis
was the influence behind the version of mother’s day that we celebrate today. (Julia Ward
Howe previously had proposed a version dedicated to world peace.) In 1905, Jarvis
reputedly swore at the graveside of her mother Anna Reeves Jarvis, that she would dedicate
herself to accomplishing her mother’s project to establish a Mother’s Day to honor mothers
living and dead. The ceremonies spread to virtually all the states before World War I, and
an official day was first recognized by a congressional resolution in 1914. Jone Johnson
Lewis, Anna Jarvis and Mother’s Day — Mother’s Day History, http://womenshistory.about
.com/od/mothersday/a/anna_jarvis.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2006); National Women’s
History Project, Events: The History of Mother’s Day, http://www.nwhp.org/events/moms-
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I. UNMARRIED MOTHERS VERSUS UNWED FATHERS:
MOTHERHOOD “IN THE BIOLOGICAL AND SPIRITUAL
SENSE” (“CARING” PER SE?)
With the rise of what has been called the “newer equal protection,” in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Court upset some laws because of
invidious distinctions based on the birth status of children (“illegitimacy”),
the marital status of biological mothers or fathers, or legal differentiation
between women and men in the treatment of non-marital families.
Similarly, the Justices found a number of provisions touching on these
relationships offended due process.8 Although the overwhelming majority
of these cases concerned children and their putative fathers, there were a
few that explicitly involved claims by unmarried mothers or their children.
Insofar as the Justices writing the father opinions felt obliged to establish
that unmarried parents of either gender were or were not similarly situated,
moreover, they too reflected on “motherhood.”
The law of “bastardy,” as it was called at English common-law, was
harsh. The nonmarital child was “filius nullius,” i.e., child and heir of no
one.9 By 1900, however, the American “republican modification” of
traditional law generally recognized a legal unit consisting of children and
their unmarried mothers, with consequences affecting custody, support, and
inheritance.10 Non-marital paternity, however, gave rise to only limited
rights and responsibilities, mostly designed to protect the public purse from
having to support children born outside of marriage.11 By 1968, when the
Court considered two unmarried mother laws from Louisiana, the majority
was willing to find constitutional fault with what it saw as a remaining
anomaly in that state’s approach to “sanctions against illegitimacy.”12 In
Levy v. Louisiana,13 five “illegitimate children” sued a doctor and insurance
company for damages for the wrongful death14 of their mother and to

day/history-of-moms-day.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
8. For discussion of many of these cases, see generally Oren, Paradox, supra note 1.
9. Michael Grossberg, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 197 (1985).
10. Grossberg, supra note 9, at 208-212, 224. See also, LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF
THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960
102 (1988) (while illegitimacy was considered a problem, by the 1890s critics believed that
it was best to keep mother and child together. “This belief represented a victory for the
sentimental cult of motherhood.”).
11. Grossberg, supra note 9, at 215-217.
12. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insur. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 74 (1968).
13. Id. at 68.
14. Wrongful death actions compensate surviving beneficiaries for the loss of their
decedents. Wrongful death actions did not exist at common law, but are solely the creation
of statutes. The dissent in Glona emphasized this distinction, and claimed that a recent
survey of American law showed that the statutes using the word “child” or “children”
defined those beneficiaries as legitimate children only. Glona, 391 U.S. at 76, citing S.
Speiser, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 587 (1966).
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recover as her survivors for the pain and suffering she experienced.15 In a
companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance
Co.,16 an unmarried mother sought recovery for the wrongful death of her
child, who was killed in an automobile accident.17 Louisiana, however,
refused recovery under these two circumstances on the grounds of avoiding
incentives for immorality, and punishing sin, respectively.18 In two short
opinions, Justice Douglas dismissed this reasoning as irrational.19 Louise
Levy
gave birth to [the five children that sued for her death] and . . . they
lived with her; . . . she treated them as a parent would treat any
other child; and . . . she worked as a domestic servant to support
them, taking them to church every Sunday and enrolling them, at
her own expense in a parochial school.20
The rights at issue concerned the “intimate, familial relationship
between a child and his own mother.”21 Justice Douglas decried letting the
wrongdoer go free because of the legal status of the children’s birth.22 He
defended Louise Levy’s motherhood: “These children, though illegitimate,
were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were
indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death they
suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent would.”23 In Glona, the
Supreme Court’s conclusion was the same: a biological mother is a mother,
even where she never married the father.24 Thus “where the claimant is
plainly the mother, the State denies equal protection of the laws to withhold
relief merely because the child, wrongfully killed, was born to her out of
wedlock.”25
15. Levy, 391 U.S. at 69. Louisiana law provided that the deceased’s right to recover
for all non-property damages he suffered survived for one year after the death and could be
inherited and recovered by certain named survivors.
16. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
17. Glona, 391 U.S. at 74.
18. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 70; Glona, 391 U.S. at 75. The two cases posed somewhat
different problems, because in Levy it was the innocent child who was denied recovery,
while in Glona, it was the “sin” of the mother that was being punished by refusing her a
remedy.
19. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71; Glona 391 U.S. at 75.
20. Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.
21. Id. at 71.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 72.
24. Glona, 391 U.S. at 75-6.
25. Id. at 76. Compare Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979), upholding a Social
Security provision of “mother’s insurance benefits” for persons dependent on a wage earner
who became widowed or divorced that excluded the mother of a non-marital child. Justice
Rehnquist wrote for a divided Court that there was a “rational relationship” to the
government’s desire to ease the economic dislocation that occurs when a wage earner dies,
forcing the surviving parent to choose between working or staying home to take care of the
children. Congress could assume that this dislocation occurred in a marital, but not typically
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By contrast to the brevity and bold assertion of irrationality in the
majority opinions of Levy and Glona, the Court splintered in Parham v.
Hughes,26 which involved Georgia’s wrongful death statute. Georgia
prohibited a father who failed to legitimate his child from recovering for
his son’s wrongful death, while an unmarried mother was entitled to do
so.27 The plurality, the concurring opinion, and the dissent did not even
agree whether the pertinent classifications to be examined were based on
gender. Because “mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not
similarly situated,” the plurality was convinced that the statute was not
based on any invidious “overbroad generalizations about men as a class,
but rather the reality that in Georgia only a father can by unilateral action
legitimate an illegitimate child.”28 The classification therefore is not men
versus women, mothers versus fathers, but “fathers who have legitimated
their children” versus those who have not. As a result, the plurality found
it unnecessary to apply the heightened (intermediate) scrutiny that the
Court had come to apply to gender-based distinctions, and consequently
decided it was easy to uphold the law.29
Like the dissent, concurring Justice Lewis F. Powell recognized gender
classifications when he saw them, but unlike them, he thought that the
statutory differences were justified because fathers of illegitimate children
are not similarly situated to mothers.30 The identity of mothers is clear, but
it can be difficult to establish the father of an illegitimate child: “The
marginally greater burden placed upon fathers [to legitimate] is no more
in a non-marital family. Using a low level of scrutiny for the discrimination between
classifications of mothers, the Court also dismissed the “incidental and speculative impact”
on classifications of children (marital versus nonmarital). Therefore, there was no
discrimination against them either. By contrast to this result, the Court had previously
invalidated the exclusion of fathers from these benefits. See, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975). In that case, the Court reasoned that despite any empirical basis for
the belief that fathers are generally wage-earners, while mothers stay at home to care for
children, the one-sided statute constituted a prohibited generalization that violated the rights
of women workers who received less coverage for their families. Id. at 645. The Court
rejected the argument that the preference for “‘mothers” over fathers was benign and
designed to compensate stay at home mothers for the financial difficulties they faced if they
were forced to support their families. Rather, the Court concluded that the congressional
purpose was to allow a child who had lost one parent to have the benefit of the personal
attention of the other parent, who would not be forced to go out to work. Id. at 648-49.
Distinguishing between mothers and fathers on that basis was wholly irrational, as each
“parent” enjoyed the same constitutional right to the care, custody and companionship of his
or her children. Id. at 651-52.
26. 441 U.S. 347 (1979). Justice Stewart, who dissented in Levy and Glona, wrote
the plurality opinion, 441 U.S. at 348. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, id. at 359.
Justice White wrote for the four dissenters. Id. at 361.
27. Id. at 348-349.
28. Id. at 356.
29. Id. at 353-54, (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976)).
30. Id. at 359-60 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
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severe than is required by the marked difference between proving paternity
and proving maternity — a difference we have recognized repeatedly.”31
Lemeul Parham’s father had given his son his name, signed his birth
certificate, visited him, and contributed to his support before the child’s
death.32 But the unmarried Mr. Parham had never taken the additional step
available to him under Georgia law of legitimizing his son. The father had
it in his own hands to answer the State’s concerns about proof of paternity,
but he failed to do so. Thus, Justice Powell reasoned that the distinction
between mothers and fathers satisfied the demands of a standard that
required means that substantially related to an important governmental
objective.33
The dissent agreed with Justice Powell that the Georgia statute treated
fathers differently than mothers by requiring a certain kind of proof of
paternity from unmarried men.34 They were amazed, however, at a circular
reasoning that justified this distinction based on still another discriminatory
difference: fathers had to legitimate their children; mothers did not.35 None
of the interests proffered by the State of Georgia justified the
discrimination between mothers and fathers. The dissent rejected any
notion that the statute helped the State promote “a legitimate family unit”
or set a standard of morality, as much too tenuous a connection to satisfy
heightened scrutiny.36 Why would this be true for a rule that created
obstacles for fathers, when unmarried mothers were not similarly
burdened? As to proof problems, the dissent was not convinced of their
urgency in this context. While the Court’s intestacy cases displayed
sensitivity to the need to resolve quickly the claims of heirs to property and
to settle estates, there was “no comparable interest in protecting a tortfeasor
from having his liability litigated and determined in the usual way.”37
Finally, the dissent objected to a stereotype that painted all unmarried
fathers who failed to legitimate their children as “suffer[ing] no real loss
from the child’s wrongful death.”38 Maybe it was true of “certain” of those
parents, but this kind of blanket presumption that unmarried fathers never
maintain as close a relationship to their children as unmarried mothers was
unacceptable.39 The dissent reiterated the Court’s message of Caban v.
Mohammed40 that no “broad, gender-based distinction . . . is required by
31. Id. at 360 (citing Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 268-69).
32. Id. at 349.
33. Id. at 360.
34. Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 362-63.
37. Id. at 364. For the checkered path of the father cases, see generally Oren,
Paradox, supra note 1.
38. Parham, 441 U.S. at 366.
39. Id.
40. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at every
phase of a child’s development.”41 The footnote to this statement is very
interesting. The dissent cites statistics reflecting that in “1977, 15.5% of all
children and 51.7% of the black children born in the United States had
unmarried parents.”42 It continued, “[t]he suggestion that anything
approaching a majority of the fathers of these children would ‘suffer no
real loss from the child’s wrongful death’ is incredible.”43 The footnote
facts, cited without a context in this case, imply a distinct racial point: Can
the Court accept without constitutional cavil a blanket generalization that
denigrates the caring and attachment of so many black fathers?
According to the Parham dissenters, the stereotypes incorporated into
Georgia’s statutory scheme went beyond the assumptions about unmarried
fathers. Indeed, by state law, even for a legitimate child, the father “was
absolutely prohibited from bringing a wrongful-death action if the mother
is still alive, even if the mother does not desire to bring suit and even if the
parents are separated or divorced. The incredible presumption that fathers,
but not mothers, of illegitimate children suffer no injury when they lose
their children is thus only a more extreme version of the underlying and
equally untenable presumption that fathers are less deserving of recovery
than are mothers.”44 While the dissenters and the plurality in Parham
debated the quality of fatherhood and what assumptions state law may
make about it, neither had to strain to accept the quality of motherhood
embraced in the Georgia statute: mothers cared and suffered when they lost
their children, whether they were married to the fathers or not; the only
question was whether fathers, or enough of them, shared this characteristic.
I have written elsewhere about the full line of constitutional cases in
which unmarried fathers attempted to establish or protect personal
relationships with their children.45 Those decisions also provoked debate
among the Justices about just how much fathers cared in comparison to
mothers. Were unmarried fathers really similarly situated to unmarried

41. Parham, 441 U.S. at 367 (citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 380).
42. Id. (citing U.S. Dept. of HEW, National Center for Health Statistics, 27 Vital
Statistics Report, No. 11, p. 19 (1979)).
43. Id. at 367, n.14.
44. Id. at 368. Wrongful death recoveries were initially limited to pecuniary loss.
Subjected to great criticism, this restriction gave way (through legislative action and judicial
interpretation) to the idea that the loss of companionship of a child was a compensable
injury, just like the loss of consortium of a spouse. For example, in 1983 the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that a parent’s recovery under the wrongful death statute includes the
loss of companionship and society and damages for mental anguish suffered as a result of
the child’s wrongful death. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex. 1983). The
destruction of the parent-child relationship results in mental anguish, and it would be
unrealistic to separate injury to the familial relationship from emotional injury. Id. “The
real loss sustained by the parent . . . is the loss of love, advice, comfort, companionship, and
society.” Id. at 251.
45. See Oren, Paradox, supra note 1, at 50-70.
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mothers, who could be presumed to have a truly familial relationship with
their children by virtue of birth alone? Or, was more required from these
men? The Court decided in a series of cases where mothers apparently
wanted their husbands to adopt or otherwise legally step into the shoes of
the child’s biological father that in order to establish constitutionally
protected rights, unmarried fathers had to demonstrate “biology ‘plus,’”
i.e., that they actually had some kind of developed relationship to their
children.46 The disputes between majority and dissenting opinions in these
cases illuminate the presumptions that the jurists themselves made about
motherhood and fatherhood, at least of the unmarried variety. So, for
example, the Court quite properly decided in Stanley v. Illinois,47 that the
State of Illinois could not presume that the unmarried father of three nonmarital children was unfit to raise them after the death of their mother,
removing them from his legal custody without any kind of a hearing.48 He
had “sired and raised” them for 18 years, giving rise to a clearly protected
constitutional interest in his continued family relationships. Mothers could
not be treated this way, and the Court concluded that a father like Mr.
Stanley also could not.49 However, the State of Illinois argued, and the
dissent agreed, that unwed fathers were different than unwed mothers. Not
only was it easier to prove motherhood, but also mothers in general cared
about their children, while nonmarital fathers typically did not.50 If they
did care, they could either marry the mother, or, at the least, legitimate the
child.51 Following a case in which a biological father failed to show that he
had enough of a relationship to block the adoption of his child by the
mother’s husband,52 the Court again returned to a debate about the
differences between motherhood and fatherhood.
In Caban v.
Mohammed,53 the majority was impressed with the quality of Mr. Caban’s
relationship to his older non-marital children: his name was on their birth
certificates; he had lived with them; and he continued to visit and
contribute to their support even after his separation from their mother and
the marriages each parent contracted with someone else. Having “come
forward to participate in the rearing of his child” in this fashion, Mr. Caban
earned the perquisites of true fatherhood and could block adoption by
another man.54
46. Id. at 118.
47. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
48. Id. at 649.
49. Id. at 650-58.
50. Id. at 666 (Burger, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 664.
52. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). The plaintiff based his equal
protection claim on distinctions between married and unmarried fathers, but did not raise a
gender challenge. Id. at 253 & 254 n.13.
53. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
54. Id. at 392.
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The Caban dissenters, however, insisted that unwed motherhood and
fatherhood were different.55 Only the mother carries the child; it is she who
has the constitutional right to decide whether to bear it or not. Moreover,
while the mother’s identity is obvious, the father’s may never be known.
While unwed motherhood meant having to make decisions about the
child’s future, such as adoption, unwed fathers might float in the wind. If
they were allowed to intervene later, they could upset the whole scenario of
secure newborn adoption.56
The debate over mothers and fathers subsequently was reprised in Lehr
v. Robertson,57 which involved a challenge to New York State’s “putative
father registry” law. Because he was the wrong kind of unmarried father,
Mr. Lehr lost out. He had failed to “demonstrat[e] a full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the
rearing of his child,”58 and he had not even managed to send a postcard to
the putative father registry to inform the state of his interest in his
offspring.59 As a result, he lost the opportunity presented by his biological
link, to ripen it into a relationship protected by the Constitution. This was a
Due Process, not an Equal Protection argument, but the majority also
insisted that a reluctant unmarried father was not similarly situated with the
unmarried mother.60 Therefore, any gender distinction was easy to justify.
Dissenters White, Marshall, and Blackmun, however, were not convinced
that the mere biological relationship was of such little weight, especially
where the issue at stake was the simple right to a hearing.61
In 2001, a divided Court once again considered the differences between
unwed motherhood and fatherhood. Nguyen v. INS62 was a case in which
an American non-marital father, who had raised the now-adult child that he
sired by a non-citizen mother, unsuccessfully challenged a gender-based
provision of immigration law. Children born abroad to an unmarried
American citizen mother (and alien father) were eligible for United States
citizenship upon simple proof of the biological relationship, without much
more.63 Reverse the circumstances, however, and the children of
unmarried American men faced substantially greater obstacles to derivative
citizenship.64 In this case, the majority equated biology to destiny for both
55. Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 404-05.
57. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
58. Id. at 261.
59. Id. at 251.
60. Id. at 267-68.
61. Id. at 271 (White, J., dissenting).
62. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1988) (there was also a residency requirement for the citizen
parent 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), incorporating by reference, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g)).
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (the unmarried citizen father had to demonstrate proof of the
biological relationship by clear and convincing evidence and, inter alia, that he agreed in
writing to support the child until the age of 18; and that before the child reached 18, he did
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mothers and fathers. Congress was allowed to differentiate based on the
“incontrovertible” fact that mothers and fathers are not similarly situated.65
While the majority held that a woman who gives birth to a child is clearly
her biological mother, they ruled that even in this day of DNA testing, the
proof of paternity is less secure. 66
The second “important governmental interest” the Court said was
furthered by the statute is even more telling about the Nguyen majority’s
view of the differences between unwed motherhood and fatherhood. The
Court insisted that Congress recognized that the “opportunity for a
meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the
very event of birth. The mother knows that the child is in being and is hers
and has an initial point of contact with him. There is at least an opportunity
for mother and child to develop a real, meaningful relationship.”67
Unmarried citizen fathers, however, who may be stationed around the
world spreading their progeny with little regard for the consequences, lack
this birth-given opportunity.68 As a result, even though in the case before
the Court there was an absent alien mother and an American father with a
developed relationship to his child,69 opportunity apparently could trump
reality. Rather than relying on forbidden generalizations or stereotypes, the
majority held that Congress permissibly constructed its scheme with the
“enduring physical differences” between women and men (mothers and
fathers) in mind.70
The Court’s use of an important decision written by Justice Ginsburg to
trumpet its point about the physical differences between men and women,
however, is misleading, and very disturbing from the point of view of
feminist jurisprudence. Immediately after the quoted words, the Virginia
Military Institute v. U.S. (“VMI”)71opinion continues. Justice Ginsburg

one of several things to legally establish his paternity or to legitimate the child. Joseph
Boulais, the father in the Nyguen case had in fact brought his young son back from Vietnam
and raised him. He did not recognize the importance of taking the additional formal steps
until efforts were made to deport his 22-year-old son, who had been convicted of serious
criminal offenses. The father’s subsequent proof of biological paternity and adjudication in
a Texas court was rejected for citizenship purposes as occurring too late under the statutory
scheme); Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
65. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.
66. Id. at 54.
67. Id. at 65.
68. Id. at 64-65.
69. Id. at 57 (Joseph Boulais was a civilian employee in Vietnam who fathered a son
out of wedlock with a Vietnamese woman in 1969. After his relationship with the mother
ended, the family of the father’s new girlfriend cared for the boy, until his father brought
him to Texas at the age of 6, thereafter raising him to adulthood).
70. Id. at 68 (citing Virginia Military Institute v. U.S. (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996)).
71. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that Virginia’s male-only military
and leadership academy, coupled with a female only institution that lacked comparable
prestige and resources, violated the equal protection of the laws).
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explained: “‘Inherent differences’ between men and women, we have come
to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s
opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women ‘for
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’ . . . to ‘promot[e]
equal employment opportunity,’. . . to advance full development of the
talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.” The Nguyen biology-isdestiny holding, however, fits none of these categories. It is ironic, and
perhaps dangerous, that the Court uses VMI, a case with one of the
strongest rulings against gender bias, to justify the Nguyen result with its
tepid application of intermediate scrutiny. This is not good for women in
any sense. By reducing parentage to the opportunity to be present at birth,
the Court denies respect to a man who was a true father to his son, but it
also limits the sphere of motherhood as well (to mere presence at birth).
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissent in Nguyen reminded the
majority that laws were to be examined quite closely for invidious
“overbroad sex-based classifications.”72
Hypothetical government
purposes loosely connected to such categories do not pass muster under
gender-based Equal Protection jurisprudence. Thus, the dissent found it
easy to dismiss the first purported goal of the statute — ensuring the
existence of a biological relationship.73 While mothers suffered no extra
burdens in proving the biological relationship, even with the help of
modern DNA testing fathers faced insurmountable obstacles if they failed
to make their proof before the child turned age 18 and in the prescribed
manner.74
The dissent’s second criticism is even more persuasive: How can the
mere “opportunity” to develop a parent-child relationship be more
important than the reality?75 Even if opportunity counts, Congress could
choose a sex-neutral alternative that required that a parent be present at
birth or have knowledge of the birth.76 Instead, it adopted a rule that only
crudely fit the means to the purported ends, something that may be
acceptable in ordinary constitutional review, but which is banned when a
classification meriting heightened scrutiny, such as gender, is at issue.
Stereotypes, not physical differences between men and women, underlay
the statute and therefore the dissent would find it invalid.77 The dissenting
Justices were unconvinced that the sex-based difference in the law
“substantially relate[d] to the achievement of the goal of a ‘real, practical

72. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Souter, and Breyer).
73. Id. at 79 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 80.
75. Id. at 84.
76. Id. at 86.
77. Id. at 87.
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relationship’” between citizen parent and child.78 Instead, they saw a
stereotype in action — “the generalization that mothers are significantly
more likely than fathers. . . to develop caring relationships with their
children.”79 This sentiment brings us back to the heart of the debate over
unmarried motherhood versus unwed fatherhood: are mothers parents in the
“biological and in the spiritual sense,” while fathers who do not marry the
mothers or timely legitimate their children are different?
Unwed fatherhood is problematic for the Court, provoking sharp
dissent, and even some comments that suggest fatherhood is not the same
in all communities or cultures. On the other hand, it seems that the Court
equates giving birth, to motherhood, to a per se caring relationship with
those biological children. In other words, biological motherhood is
motherhood in the spiritual sense. One should not assume however, that
this essentialist view of motherhood (“mothers are caring”)80 means that the
Court honors mothers in a deeper sense that would provide social support
for mothers in this society. The next set of decisions amply illustrates how
apparently beneficent assumptions about motherhood can take a nasty turn
in a different context, where the mothers in question are dependent,
unmarried, and perhaps women of color.

II. DEPENDENT UNMARRIED MOTHERHOOD
Based on various state and local “Mother’s Aid” program models,81 the
1935 federal enactment of “Aid to Dependent Children” (later “Aid to
Families with Dependent Children” or “AFDC”) was gendered from its
conception.82 It was designed to facilitate “the care of dependent children
in their own home.”83 In other words, at the outset, the federal program
78. Id. at 88-89.
79. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 89 (the dissent condemned this generalization even where
there was some empirical evidence in support, and it was not disrespectful to women as a
class).
80. Any criticism of the essentialist view that mothers are automatically caring, is not
meant to deny the empirical fact that mothers do most of the “caring” work in society at
present, whether unpaid for children and the elderly, or in the paid labor market in the health
services industries. See, e.g., ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD; WHY THE
MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 7 (2002) (citing economist
SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MAN (1997) on caring for
children and, increasingly, for the elderly).
81. Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions From
Welfare ‘Reform,’ Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 733 n.236 (1998).
82. GORDON, supra note 10, at 105-107. Although Boston’s Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children was established by middle-class progressive reformers
and reflected their agenda, by 1920, even those social workers had come to support
“mothers’ pensions.” Their embrace of this policy was driven in significant part by client
demand from single or deserted women who needed to support their children and wanted to
keep their families intact. Gordon also argues that the reformers’ gender assumptions and
desire to hold men responsible and to preserve filial ties, were in tension with the mothers’
pension benefit. Nonetheless, that reform caught on anyway. Id. at 104.
83. Murphy, supra note 81, at 733 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964)).
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apparently acknowledged the value of caring stay-at-home mothers.84
AFDC became the chief form of assistance to mothers and their children
who were dependent on public largesse.85 The 1960s, however, saw a
sharp rise in the welfare rolls, provocatively and inaccurately blamed by
some on alleged deficiencies in the “Negro family.”86 Critics have
described a progression of work requirements imposed on dependent
mothers that reflected notions about what is appropriate work for what kind
of mother. Black mothers in the South were expected to work as domestics
or farmhands in the 1960s. By the end of the decade, various kinds of
incentives to enter the workforce were built into AFDC for dependent
mothers, sometimes requiring participation in job training programs. In the
early 1970s, the government required mothers of school-age children to
register for work and training in order to be eligible to receive benefits.
The 1988 Family Support Act also added mothers of 3-year-olds to the
work requirement. Finally, when AFDC was replaced by Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in the PRWORA in 1996, the work
expectations became universal. That “reform” imposed maximum periods
for receipt of benefits before turning mothers of children out into the work
force along with everyone else. 87
As a consequence of the fall-out from the increases in assistance rolls,
along with other economic, social, and political developments, the public
policy of dependency began to impose greater restrictions and personal
indignities on the mothers and children on welfare.88 Some states imposed
“substitute father”89 and stepfather and “male person assuming the role of
spouse” even though not legally married to the mother (“MARS”)90
84. Murphy, supra note 81, at 733. It is not clear, however, that the payments were
seen as compensation for labor beneficial to society, i.e., the raising and caring for children.
See, e.g., Linda Gordon, supra note 10, at 107 (noting that nineteenth century preference to
institutionalize children rather than aid the mother to keep them, meant that most of the
children in institutions were only “half-orphans,” with mothers who might have been able to
care for them with assistance). For the history of mothers’ pension welfare programs, see
King, v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-21 (1968) (citing J. Brown, PUBLIC RELIEF 1929-1939, at
26-32 (1940)).
85. Murphy, supra note 81, at 733 & 732, n.235 (noting that “[w]omen — typically
mothers who are divorced or separated from, or have never been married to, the fathers of
their children — represent almost all of the adult Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(“AFDC”) recipients in this country.”) (citing Jeffrey Lehman & Sheldon Danziger,
“Ending Welfare, Leaving the Poor to Face New Risk, Forum Applied Res. & Pub. Pol’y
Winter 1997, at 43-44 n.4 (Of the 4.8 million families that received AFDC benefits in a
typical month in fy 1993, almost 90 percent were fatherless)).
86. See Oren, Paradox, supra note 1, at 94-95 (citing Frances Fox Piven & Richard
A. Cloward, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 198 (2d ed.
1993)).
87. Murphy, supra note 81, at 735-36.
88. Oren, Paradox, supra note 1, at 96-97; Murphy, supra note 81, at 733-34.
89. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311 (1968) (invalidating these regulations on a
statutory basis in the final days of the Warren Court).
90. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 553 (1970) (invalidating MARS regulations
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regulations that denied benefits to children where the mother “cohabited”
with, or lived together with a man in a spouse-type relationship, even if he
was not a “parent” with an obligation of support to those children. 91 Some
states staged unannounced home “visits,” and terminated benefits to
mothers who refused them.92 The Social Security Amendments of 1974,
moreover, directed all states to demand that mothers receiving AFDC
cooperate in establishing the identity of the fathers of their children.93 The
enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988 required states to achieve the
establishment of paternity in a certain number of AFDC cases, and
subsidized those efforts with federal funds.94 The 1984 Deficit Reduction
Act (“DFRA”) imposed “deemed income” rules that treated a household as
a single filing unit, regardless of the fact that the fathers of some of the
children included were supporting them independently.95 In 1996, these
developments culminated in a thorough-going overhaul which abolished
AFDC in favor of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (or “TANF”),
premised on the notion of a time limit for assistance, after which virtually
all family heads, including single mothers, would be expected to move into
the private workforce.96
Commentators have debated whether the replacement of AFDC by
TANF represented a departure from the view of motherhood as valuable
that was allegedly once recognized by public policy; or was merely the
apotheosis of long-term attitudes toward the “deviance” of single and
dependent mothers.97 For their part, after the Warren Court gave way to
the Burger Court, the Justices generally deferred to these policies with their
as a matter of statutory interpretation).
91. King, 392 U.S. at 313-14 (by Alabama law a “substitute father” included any
man who lived in the mother’s home or visited it frequently in order to have sex with her, or
had sex with her elsewhere, whether or not the children were his or he had any obligation of
support to them).
92. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 310 (1971) (upholding New York State’s
unannounced visits).
93. See Social Security Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337
(1975); S. REP. NO. 93-1356 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8133, 8154-55
(cooperation requirement for AFDC). Cf. 45 CFR § 232.12(b), 233.10(a)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C.
§ 608(a)(2), (requirement of cooperation for Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. § 1396k. (Cooperation
requirement for Food Stamps). But see 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030 (waiver of cooperation
requirement for good cause); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) (good cause waiver of
cooperation requirement in domestic violence situations).
94. See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343, 2348-50
(1988).
95. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494; 89 Stat. 1145; amended Section
402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (1982 ed. Supp. III).
96. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2000)).
See Oren, Paradox, supra note 1, at 97-98.
97. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 81, at 735-36 (noting the debate between Carol
Sanger, who finds a policy shift that devalued mothers; and Martha Minow, who thinks that
the latest changes marked no real departure from a class and race-ridden view of the
“deviance” of unmarried mothers).
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rigid and coercive views of proper family relationships. For example,
federal law provided that a state agency that had “reason to believe that the
home in which a relative and child receiving aid reside is unsuitable for the
child because of the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of such child . . . shall
bring such condition to the attention of the appropriate court or law
enforcement agencies in the State.”98 Unobjectionable as this concern for
children is, New York State chose to implement it through periodic,
unannounced, and warrantless home visits.99 Benefits were terminated if a
recipient refused these conditions.100 If viewed as an ordinary “search,”
these visits invaded the very core of privacy in the home protected by the
Fourth Amendment.101 However, the majority of the Court found them not
to be “searches” in the usual meaning of the term, and “reasonable” in any
case.102 The Court argued that any “rights” claimed by the mother had to
yield to the “needs” of the child.103 Moreover, this was a question of public
money, where the State has a “paramount” interest in seeing that it is spent
as intended.104 The Court even cast aspersions on the woman who
challenged the State in the case before them.
“The record is revealing as to Mrs. James’ failure ever really to
satisfy the requirements for eligibility; as to constant and repeated
demands; as to attitude towards the caseworkers; as to reluctance to
cooperate; as to evasiveness; and as to occasional belligerency.
There are indications that all was not always well with the infant
Maurice (skull fracture, a dent in the head, a possible rat bite). The
picture is a sad and unhappy one.”105
At the same time, it insisted, even in the face of disturbing information
about qualifications, that the caseworker “is not a sleuth but rather, we trust
is a friend to one in need.”106
98. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 315, (citing Section 402, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1964 ed. Supp.
V)) (In addition, if a state had reason to think that the payments of aid were not being used
in the best interests of the child, it could counsel the recipient, and, in the absence of
improvement, seek appointment of a guardian, protective payments, or imposition of civil or
criminal penalties).
99. Id. at 319-20.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 327-28 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 317 (finding it consistent with Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) and City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) in which divided Courts found that
administrative inspections by city housing inspector for violation of building’s occupancy
permit; and a fire department’s fire code inspection, respectively, required a warrant).
103. Id. at 318.
104. Id. at 319.
105. Id. at 322, n.9 (this tainting of Mrs. James occurred without any indication that
her treatment of her child had been of concern to the state through an abuse and neglect
action).
106. Id. at 323, n.11 (the Court maintained this optimistic slant on the role of the
caseworker in the face of a grim amicus brief from AFSCME, the union bargaining for the
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In this beneficent world, in which any possible criminal prosecution
would be merely a fortuitous by-product, “the warrant argument is out of
place.”107 The “only consequence” of refusal to countenance the home
invasion by an untrained social worker was that “payment of benefits
ceases.”108 This apparently was just too bad in light of the administrative
needs of the program.109
Justice Marshall dissented pointedly. He found it odd that caseworkers
needed no warrant to enter the homes of poor mothers, and while there to
look for evidence of welfare fraud or child abuse, although they clearly
could not do this across the board. “Yes, abuse and exploitation of children
is terrible, but why only in poor homes – why not go into all American
homes? . . . Or is this Court prepared to hold as a matter of constitutional
law that a mother, merely because she poor, is substantially more likely to
injure or exploit children? Such a categorical approach to an entire class of
citizens would be dangerously at odds with the tenets of our democracy.”110
The visitation regulations cut deeply into the dependent mother’s
control over the privacy of her home. The Court later found it similarly
easy to approve AFDC regulations that cut as deeply into the organization
of the personal relationships of her family.111 The 1984 Deficit Reduction
Act (DRA) required states to “take into account, with certain specified
exceptions, the income of all parents, brothers, and sisters living in the
same home” for purposes of eligibility for benefits.112 This meant that a
woman who had some children whose fathers supported them, and some
whose fathers did not, had to treat them all as a family unit in her
caseworkers, that noted that they were often badly trained or untrained, young and
inexperienced. “Despite this astonishing description by the union of the lack of
qualification of its own members for the work they are employed to do, we must assume
that the caseworker possesses at least some qualifications and some dedication to duty”).
107. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 324. By contrast, the Court recently rejected the so-called
“special needs doctrine” for administrative searches in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 637 (2001). Charleston’s plan for reporting to the police the drug test results of
pregnant women who came for help to the public hospital came under fire and was struck
down by the Supreme Court. See generally, Ellen Marrus, Crack Babies and the
Constitution: Ruminations About Pregnant Addicted Women After Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 47 VILL. L. REV. 299 (2002).
108. Id. at 325.
109. Id. at 326.
110. Id. at 338-40, 341-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Justice Marshall characterized
the social workers as sleuths, as well as case managers, who were required to report
evidence of the felonies of welfare fraud and child abuse. Justice Marshall was unimpressed
by the rehabilitative and helpful posture of the home invasion: “[a] paternalistic notion that a
complaining citizen’s constitutional rights can be violated so long as the State is somehow
helping him is alien to our Nation’s philosophy.”) (citing Olmstead v. US, 277 U.S. 438,
479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard
to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent.”)).
111. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
112. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494; 98 Stat. 1145; amended Section
402(a)(38) of the SSA, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (1982 ed., Supp. III).
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application for assistance. The income the supporting father provided for
his child was then counted against the needs of all. This was enforced even
if it meant a net loss of income to the whole family, or that the child with
an active father was penalized financially or emotionally. One of the
plaintiff mothers in Bowen v. Gilliard testified that her child’s father was so
upset about his son being forced onto welfare that he ceased making
support payments voluntarily, and even stopped coming around to see his
son.113
The Court announced that, like evaluation of other parts of the Social
Security Act, its review must be “deferential.”114 Be that as it may,
however, it is hard to miss the satisfied tone in the Court’s review of
welfare policy. The deference afforded to congressional efforts to save
“huge sums of money meant” that the regulation only had to be “rational”
to be upheld by the Court.115 In light of the contention that the regulations
intruded onto constitutionally protected family relationships,116 however,
the Court engaged in a rather longer explanation of current policy, with its
clever money-saving features. The State was paying the costs; there was
nothing wrong with its trying to recoup some of them through assignment
of child support claims against fathers; and, happily, millions of these
orders, to the tune of saving $6.8 billion dollars had been established and
enforced.117
Once again, the dissent had a very different take: Justices Brennan and
Marshall noted the changing demographics of an American society in
which the percentage of households headed by a single parent increased
twofold from 1970 to 1984, to 26 percent.118 For black families, this figure
approached 60 percent.119 “Almost 90 percent of single-parent households
are headed by women,”120 often living under difficult economic
circumstances. The dissent argued that in their precarious lives, these
children had as much of an interest in maintaining contact with their
113. The child frequently asked why his father did not see him anymore; he wet his
bed; and was more disruptive and less successful in school. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 621-22
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 598. See also, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 48485 (“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.”).
Deferential review, however, yields where the classification involved merits heightened
scrutiny, such as in explicitly gendered provisions of the SSA. See, e.g., Weinberger, 420
U.S. at 636 (“Mother’s” insurance benefits, that excluded fathers whose insured wives’ died
leaving them to care for children alone, violated equal protection).
115. Id. at 598.
116. Id. at 601.
117. Id. at 603.
118. Id. at 613 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Current Population Reports, Household and Family Characteristics: March
1984, p. 1 (1985) (Current Population Reports)).
119. Id. at n.5.
120. Id. at 613.
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fathers, as with the mothers with whom they lived.121 If the relationship
with the mother was nurtured by every day care and contact, the “bond” to
the father was also sustained through his ability to support his child.122
Thus, the dissenters were concerned about the adverse effects on the fatherchild relationship of the income-deeming rules, as illustrated by Sherrod’s
father’s reaction. The only viable economic alternative for the boy would
have been to move out of his mother’s household. He was between a rock
and a hard place – the child could either have his mother’s custodial care or
his father’s economic support, but not both.123
It is impossible to separate the Court’s view of poor motherhood from
its attitude toward poverty in general (or the “right” to social services, or
rather, lack thereof).124 Although there have been a handful of cases that
suggested that under certain circumstances indigency is a disfavored
classification meriting a closer look from the Court,125 the prevailing
principle is that poverty gets no special treatment.126 Equal Protection
jurisprudence, moreover, generally does not consider the disparate impact
on a group of people. Only intentional differential treatment violates the
Fourteenth Amendment,127 so it does not matter constitutionally that 90%
of all single parents are mothers; or that black families may be
disproportionately affected by government regulations. When evaluating
the Court’s views on dependent unmarried motherhood, however, those
facts seem quite salient indeed. As discussed in Part I of this Article, the
Court seemingly made some assumptions about mothers versus fathers:
even unmarried mothers are caring, but unwed fathers may not meet that
standard. In these AFDC cases, however, motherhood comes under
suspicion itself. The dependent mother (who is poor and perhaps not so
coincidentally may be black) cannot be trusted to be autonomously caring.
Therefore, she is subject to manipulation by the State, which may drop in
on the privacy of her home at any time to make sure she is not wasting
money or abusing her children. She also cannot choose how to organize
121. Id. at 614-15.
122. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 617.
123. Id. at 626.
124. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (child known to be in danger had no constitutional right to protective services);
Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzalez, 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005) (woman with stategranted protective order has no procedural due process right to its enforcement).
125. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (state cannot prevent access to
courts for a divorce due to indigency); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (state’s
double bond requirement for tenant actions violates Equal Protection); Little v. Streater, 452
U.S. 1 (1982) (state must pay for blood tests necessary for indigent man to disprove his
paternity); MLB v. SLJ, 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (state must pay for trial transcripts necessary
for indigent woman to appeal termination of her parental rights).
126. See, e.g., San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18, 24 (1973) (holding that
educational differences due to disparities in school district wealth does not violate the Equal
Protection clause).
127. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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her household: if she wants to live with all of her children, she has to suffer
a loss of resources to support them. She cannot frame her relationships
with the men who fathered her children. She has to “cooperate” in
identifying and suing them, and she cannot have a separate agreement with
a supportive father of one of them. The insult is offered to the poor men
and children, as much as to the women in this scenario. Nonetheless, it
tells us something uncomfortable about the “motherhood” of dependent
single women.

III. MOTHERHOOD AND WORKING WOMEN
At first blush, the United States Supreme Court appears to have made
giant progressive strides in its attitudes in the next set of cases, i.e., those
about working mothers. There is no question that compared to the
dependent unmarried mother, the working mother has garnered more words
of praise and respect in the Court’s opinions, especially since the mid1970s. However, even from this angle, there are some ironic limits –
motherhood seems to be honored primarily by neutralizing its
significance.128
The Court clearly began with gendered notions of women in the work
place, most famously expressed in Muller v. The State of Oregon,129 which
upheld a maximum 10-hour working day for women in 1908. This case,
together with Adkins v. Children’s Hosp.,130 (which involved a minimum
wage statute), arose out of the important campaign by “social feminists” at
the turn of the nineteenth century to gain approval for protective labor
legislation for women.131 These cases were litigated in a judicial
environment that was hostile to any kind of intrusion on so-called “liberty
of contract” between employers and employees.132 Reformers in the
128. Contemporary analysts identify motherhood as responsible for most of the wage
gap between working women and working men. See, e.g., CRITTENDEN, supra note 80, at
88, 94-98 (2002) (discussing reduced earnings of mothers or “mommy tax”). It is only
those working women who are more like a man, i.e., without child-caring responsibilities in
their early working careers, whose earnings closely approach those of men’s. Id. at 87
(women between the ages of 27 and 33 who have never had children make up the narrow
slice of women in the work force whose wages constitute 98 cents to a man’s dollar).
Studies have been done for educated women who seemingly have the most potential income
to lose from the “mommy tax.” Id. at 96. However, “working-class women are also heavily
penalized for job interruptions, although these are the very women who allegedly ‘choose’
less demanding occupations that enable them to move in and out of the job market without
undue wage penalties.” Id.
129. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
130. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
131. See Sybil Lipschultz, Social Feminism and Legal Discourse, 1908-1923, 2
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 131 (1989); KATHRYN KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE
NATION’S WORK: THE RISE OF WOMEN’S POLITICAL CULTURE, 1830-1900 (1995); ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS; OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 186-87 (1982).
132. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down limits to
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National Women’s Trade Union League, the General Federal of Women’s
Clubs, and especially, the National Consumers’ League (NCL), believed
that gender-specific protective labor legislation was justified to improve the
lot of women in the workforce, but also for the inroads it made for all
workers on the rigid philosophy of laissez-faire. The NCL developed the
strategy behind the extensive brief co-written by Josephine Goldmarck and
her brother-in-law Louis Brandeis (later to be on the Supreme Court). In
this first-ever “Brandeis brief,” the authors asked the Court to take judicial
notice of the social science studies and facts they cited.133 The reformers of
the 1920s shared a vision of “industrial equality” between women and men,
to be achieved by recognizing and valuing difference, as exemplified by
Molly Dewson’s brief in Adkins, that their male lawyers, including
Brandeis, did not understand fully, and that the Court misused to justify
approving inequality.134 The social feminists understood the complexities
of the causes of women’s inferior position in the market place.135
The Court, however, did not share the social feminist vision. Although
the NCL briefs asked the Court to take account of the physical and social
differences between men and women in the workforce, the form that the
acknowledgement took in Justice Brewer’s opinion in Muller was a far cry
from the intent of the reformers. Instead, he proclaimed that women’s
physical structure and maternal functions meant that they must be treated
differently because of the “inherent” differences ordained by nature and by

bakery workers’ hours because such legislation is arbitrary interference with “the right and
liberty of the individual to contract in relation to his labor”). Before he ascended to the
Court, Felix Frankfurter explained how Muller was significant because it started the judicial
progress from “empty theorizing about liberty of contract to realism” in constitutional law.
See Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. REV.
353 (1916).
133. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421.
134. See Lipschultz, supra note 131.
135. For example, Alice Hamilton, who was the first occupational physician in the
United States, had studied lead poisoning in women who worked in the New Jersey and
Ohio potteries. She found that although the New Jersey women seemed worse off than men
who worked with lead, this was not true in Ohio. She attributed this to the difference in the
economic and social position of women in the two states. In New Jersey, the men were
unionized, but the women were not.
Female potteries workers were poor and
disadvantaged. In the Ohio tile works and potteries, by contrast, both sexes were organized
and the rate of lead poisoning was actually slightly higher in men. This seemed to
substantiate the German view that female susceptibility was not due to their sex but to being
poorer and having to perform double duty at the workplace and at home. As a result of
these studies, Alice Hamilton supported gender – specific protective legislation. She was
associated with the NCL campaign and she also opposed passage of the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) for many years because she feared it would jeopardize protective
legislation. Finally, in 1942 , after other progressive social legislation had created safety
and health rules for all workers, she wrote to the New York Times to withdraw her
opposition to the ERA. See Vilma Hunt, Overview in Reproductive Health Policies in the
Workplace, Proceedings of Symposium Held on May 10 and 11, 1982 in Pittsburg, PA.7-11,
Seabrook, Enny C. & David K. Parkinson eds., (1983).
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God.136 Thus, even if they could do nothing for men, legislatures could act
to protect women, who were the “mother[s] of the race.”137
The limits of the Court’s view of the special needs of working mothers
quickly became clear in the next part of the social feminist campaign. In
Adkins, the campaign sought to defend minimum wage legislation for
women. The Court,138 however, denied that Muller controlled, because
“the ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical . . . has
continued ‘with diminishing intensity’” in the wake of “revolutionary”
changes in the “contractual, political, and civil status of women,
culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment.”139 Therefore, liberty of
contract applied and women still had to make their own wage bargain with
their employers. Even though by 1923, “liberty of contract” actually was
on its way out as a constitutional doctrine,140 the justifications for genderbased distinctions in the law that were re-entrenched by Muller
unfortunately persisted until the 1970s.141 The campaign for protection
divided feminists: the social feminists and their labor allies versus radical
feminists like Alice Paul and her National Women’s Party, who supported
a platform of “equal treatment” across the board, and the passage of a
national Equal Rights Amendment.142 Even today scholars and activists
continue to debate the wisdom of the special treatment argument of the
Brandeis brief in Muller.143
In the 1960s and 1970s, the “second wave” of feminism stirred debates
about new issues such as abortion and domestic violence, but also about
correct strategies.144 Moreover, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
136. Muller, 208 U.S. at 422-23.
137. Id.
138. Louis Brandeis was on the Court by this time, but took no part in the decision.
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562 (Taft, J., dissenting), 567 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 552-53.
140. In 1937, the Court overruled the specific holding in Adkins. See West Coast
Hotel Co v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). By 1941, it was clear that general labor law
regulation was constitutionally acceptable. See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(upholding The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)).
141. See Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871, 893 (1971) (listing the many gendered laws still in existence in 1971).
142. See KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK, supra note 131, at 206-12. Even as late
as 1968, women from the progressive United Auto Workers’ Women’s Bureau who were
among the founding members of N.O.W. were forced to withdraw temporarily, until the
union could be persuaded to end its opposition to the ERA. SARA EVANS, BORN FOR
LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 230, 257-58, 277-78 (1989).
143. See, e.g., Nancy S. Erikson, Muller v. Oregon Reconsidered: The Origins of a
Sex-Based Doctrine of Liberty of Contract, 30 LAB. HIST. 228 (1989); Mary Becker, From
Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, 1219-25 (1986);
Lipschultz, supra note 131.
144. See EVANS, supra note 142, at 274-84. Two groups of largely middle-class
women were both inspired by the civil rights movement. There were the more established
and moderate professional women who founded the National Organization for Women
(N.O.W.) and the younger group of radical activists in the “women’s liberation” movement,
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1964, and more effective enforcement of Title VII in the 1970s,145 plus the
development of an “intermediate” heightened standard of constitutional
review for classifications based on gender,146 provided a brand-new context
for motherhood in the workplace. The new context for working mothers
created by these legal changes, with some significant exceptions, aspires
toward evenhanded or neutral treatment, rather than the type of “industrial
equality” propounded by some of the social feminists. It remains to be
seen, however, whether this view is all gain and no pain. The decisions
revolve around issues of pregnancy and maternity leave, exposure of fertile
women to dangerous substances in the workplace, and equal benefits
earned by working women.
The first two cases that required neutral treatment of working mothers
were a Title VII employment discrimination, and a constitutional case,
respectively. In Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,147 the company had a
policy of refusing work applications from women with pre-school age
children.148 The workforce was predominantly female, so this was an
instance of what has been called “sex-plus” discrimination.149 Although the
brief per curiam opinion of the Court seemed to suggest that if the
employer could show that “conflicting family responsibilities were more
relevant for a woman than for a man,” it might be able to meet the defense
of a bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) under the statute,150
Justice Marshall’s concurrence was having none of that: “When
performance characteristics of an individual are involved, even when
parental roles are concerned, employment opportunity may be limited only
be employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the applicant.”151
Phillips clearly came out the right way. It would have been devastating to
the early interpretations of Title VII if employers were allowed to make
assumptions about women with children and use them to deny them
employment on an equal basis with men. This would be no different than
all the years of so-called protective labor legislation that protected women

who cut their political teeth on the civil rights and anti-war movements.
145. See Laura Oren, Protection, Patriarchy, and Capitalism: The Politics and
Theory of Gender-Specific Regulation in the Workplace, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 34243 nn.114-17 [hereinafter Oren, Protection].
146. See Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (holding that preference of male administrator over
similarly situated female administratrix does not have a rational basis); Frontiero, 411 U.S.
677 (plurality would have adopted strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications); Craig,
429 U.S. 190 (Court adopted intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for
gender-based classifications).
147. Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
148. Id. at 543. Cf. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982) (airline
had policy of grounding all flight attendants who became mothers, but not fathers).
149. Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1166, 1171 (1971).
150. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
151. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J. concurring).
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right out of their jobs.152 On the other hand, the impact of women’s greater
responsibilities for child and elder care remains significant even today153
and pure neutrality does not provide the solution to the larger problem.
Pregnancy raises particularly troublesome challenges, for which
neutrality is a necessary, but partial, answer. The Cleveland Board of
Education had a policy of compulsory unpaid leave for all female teachers,
starting with their fourth month of pregnancy.154 In addition, mothers
could not return to work until the beginning of the regular school semester
after their infants turned 3 months old.155 Even then, the mothers had to
show a doctor’s certificate of fitness to work, and there was no guarantee
that their job had been held for them in the meantime.156 The Court was
hard pressed to see any rationality in the presumptions about physical
capacity behind these particular time-lines.157 Instead, it held that the
overbroad rules “employ[ed] irrebuttable presumptions that unduly
penalize a female teacher for deciding to bear a child.”158 This is not
exactly a principle of neutrality. Only women, after all, have to combine
pregnancy with work. Nor did the Court argue that different treatment on
the grounds of pregnancy was “sex discrimination,” a significant omission
in light of later cases.159
In two subsequent cases, the Court evinced its strange belief that
pregnancy-related rules generally have nothing to do with sex
discrimination. California’s disability insurance program exempted from
coverage work losses resulting from pregnancy.160 The Court had no
difficulty distinguishing this kind of rule from those subjected to a higher
standard of review in the gender-based equal protection cases. After all,
the program merely divided the insured into two groups — “pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons.” “While the first group is exclusively
152. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (holding that a state may
deny all women opportunities to tend bar in light of moral and social problems).
153. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 80.
154. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634 (1974).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 635. One of the schools also required that the teacher assure them that she
had child care which would not interfere with her school duties. Id. at 650. The compulsory
leave policy was instituted in 1952, which raises some interesting questions about post-war
economic and social pressures to conform to a domestic ideology that rejected the gains of
women in the industrial labor force during World War II, and promoted the establishment of
nuclear families with women firmly ensconced in their primary roles as wives and mothers,
even if they did work outside the home as well. For the climate of the 1950s, see generally
EVANS, supra note 142, Chapter 11; see also BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE
(1963).
157. Id. at 642.
158. Id. at 648. This is a due process analysis rather than an equal protection
analysis. Id. at 644.
159. Id. at 651. Justice Powell, who concurred in the result, stated that even though
most teachers are women, the Court was not reaching the question of whether these are sexbased classifications. Id. at 653.
160. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 489 (1974).
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female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and
actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both sexes.”161
The Court then surprised observers with its follow-up Title VII case.
Despite an authoritative interpretation of the law by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the Court decided that Congress did not intend
any different result under the statute than the Court itself had reached using
its own constitutional analysis.162 Unless a plaintiff could show that
exclusion of pregnancy was a mere pretext for sex discrimination, the
classifications were pregnant versus non-pregnant persons.163 The Court
also disavowed any notion that employers must accommodate one sex
more than the other just because of “their differing roles in ‘the scheme of
human existence.’”164
G.E. v. Gilbert mobilized the opposition. In short order, California
reversed itself to amend its own Fair Employment and Housing Act165 to
require employers to provide female employees with an unpaid pregnancy
disability leave of up to four months.166 Meanwhile, a broad-based national
coalition swiftly secured the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Amendment (“PDA”) to Title VII, which altered the definition of “sex
discrimination” in the statute to include pregnancy too.167 The consensus
fell apart, however, when the California’s new statute came before the
Court in California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra.168
Pregnancy burdens women employees uniquely, making mere nondiscrimination or neutrality problematic. Even feminist advocates have
found it difficult to conceptualize the proper legal approach: How can it be
neutrality or sameness, when only women become pregnant? How can it
be special treatment when the lessons of history demonstrate the traps of
protection?169 Although all agreeing that the new California disability
161. Id. at 496 n.20.
162. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134, 140 (1976).
163. But see Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (holding that
employer’s policy of denying accumulated seniority to female employees returning from
pregnancy leave, although neutral on its face, imposed a more substantial burden on women
than men, and therefore constituted an illegal employment practice in the absence of proof
of a “business necessity” defense; also holding that the sick leave pay claim had to be
remanded).
164. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139.
165. CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 12945(b)(2) (West 2000).
166. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 275 (1987). The State’s
Fair Employment and Housing Commission also interpreted the law to mean that employers
must reinstate women returning from pregnancy leave, unless the job was no longer
available due to business necessity. Id.
167. Id. at 277 (addition of subsection (k) to s. 701, definitional section of Title VII).
For the campaign to amend Title VII, see Oren, Protection, supra note 145, at 356 n.194.
168. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
169. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on
Culture, Courts and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151, 168-72 (1992) (discussing
the split among feminists about statutes like the Montana one in Miller-Wohl that treated
pregnancy specially, and why she still thought the equality approach was best). See also
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leave provision should be upheld (unlike a Montana statute also being
challenged),170 feminist ranks split over philosophy and tactics: In its amici
(friend of court) briefs, the ACLU argued that the PDA was a strict formal
equality guarantee that did not allow special treatment by virtue of
pregnancy. They concluded from Muller that biologically based different
treatment had harmed women in the long run, confining them to a separate
and lesser sphere of employment. The ACLU also declined to support
special treatment for pregnancy in the workplace as a kind of affirmative
action measure. This neutrality posture, however, did not mean that the
PDA necessarily conflicted with or “preempted” the state law. If the bank
offered no disability leave to men, but favored women in this way, there
would be a problem. However, since men also benefited from the general
disability policy, the two statutes could be reconciled. In fact, the state law
effectively challenged the stereotype that disability leave for women, even
including for pregnancy, differed in its essentials from disability leave for
men.171
The National Organization for Women (“NOW”) made a different
argument: taken together, the two statutes could be read as “imposing
mutual and complementary obligations upon California employers to
provide up to four months unpaid disability leave to all disabled
employees.” In that view, there was no necessary conflict, and therefore no
preemption. The net result was that the benefits were extended to both
women and men, with all employees guaranteed disability leave.172
Labor’s brief took still another position. It justified special treatment in the
form of maternity leaves because without that accommodation women’s
procreative choices were burdened, while men were free to reproduce
without paying any penalty in work force participation. In other words, in
Donna Lehnoff, Beyond Maternity Leave; America Needs a Family Policy, Legal Times,
Oct. 27, 1986, at 11 (calling “legal approval of special treatment for women based on
pregnancy and childbirth” “the top of a ‘slippery slope,’ the bottom of which is a system of
law that permits or requires discrimination against women based on their perceived or real
biological differences from men.”) (Donna Lehnoff is associate director for legal policy and
programs at Women’s Legal Defense Fund).
170. The Montana statute provided that employers must grant unpaid maternity
disability leave even if they had no other leave policy at all. See Miller-Wohl Co. Inc. v.
Commr. of Labor & Indus., 479 U.S. 1050 (1987) (vacating and remanding 692 P.2d 1243,
for consideration in light of Guerra). The Montana Supreme Court reinstated its opinion
upon remand, 744 P.2d 871 (Mont. 1987).
171. California Federal Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, Brief of the American Civil Liberties
Union, the League of Women Voters of the U.S., the League of Women Voters of Cal., the
National Women’s Political Caucus, and the Coal Employment Project, as Amici Curiae,
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Mark Guerra, 1986 WL 728369 (April 4, 1986) (No. 85494).
172. California Federal Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, Brief of the National Organization
for Women, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Bar Ass’n, Women
Lawyers Division, Washington Area Chapter; National Women’s Law Center; Women’s
Law Project; and Women’s Legal Defense Fund in Support of Neither Party Amici Curiae
1986 WL 728368 (Apr. 04, 1986) (No. 85-494).
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other to prevent a particular form of sex discrimination, this affirmative
program was necessary. According to the labor brief, that did not
transform the California law into the kind of protectionism long since
disavowed by labor along with the rest of society.173
A divided Court reflected the confusion inherent in the pregnancy
debate: Three dissenters adamantly insisted that the plain language of the
PDA requires that employers treat pregnant employees the same as anyone
else, no worse, but also no better.174 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, was
willing to uphold the state law, but only on the basis of other “plain
language” in the civil rights statute that limits the preemptive effect of
federal law.175 The majority of the Court pressed two alternative
arguments, either of which they found sufficient. The first was the “floor
not a ceiling” interpretation, i.e., that the congressional purpose behind the
PDA was to prohibit discrimination in the workplace against pregnant
women, and not to ban preferential treatment for those employees.176 The
PDA was a rejection of the majority position in Gilbert, and therefore was
entirely consistent with the dissent in that case. As Justice Brennan stated
therein, “a realistic understanding of conditions found in today’s labor
environment warrants taking pregnancy into account in fashioning
disability policies.”177
173. California Federal Sav. & Loan v. Guerra, Brief of the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amici Curiae1985 WL 670262 (Oct.
Term 1985) (No. 85-494).
While initially skeptical, organized labor had embraced protectionism at the turn of the
nineteenth century, in alliance with the social feminists. See Kessler-Harris, supra note 131,
at 201-05. Feminist ranks, however, were split over this strategy, with the National
Women’s Party, supporting the “blanket amendment” drafted by Alice Paul (the Equal
Rights Amendment), even though reformers feared it would jeopardize the improvements in
working conditions. Id. at 207. These tensions persisted into the middle of the twentieth
century. For example, the progressive United Auto Workers (UAW) had established a
“Women’s Bureau” during WWII, that condemned the effects of sex-specific protective
labor legislation as early as the 1950s, seeing such laws as excuses for discrimination
against women workers. UAW Women’s Bureau members even were among the founding
members of N.O.W. in 1968. However, they were forced to withdraw from that
organization for two years before they could persuade their union to support the Equal
Rights Amendment. Sara Evans, supra note 142, at 230, 257-58, 277-78. See also Alice
Kessler-Harris, Protection for Women: Trade Unions and Labor Laws, in DOUBLE
EXPOSURE: WOMEN’S HEALTH HAZARDS ON THE JOB AND AT HOME (Wendy
Chavkin, M.D., ed., 1984).
By the 1970s, the argument about protective labor legislation and sex discrimination
was essentially moot, and the courts had declared that Title VII preempted the remaining
sex specific laws. See, e.g., Weeks v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969); Rosenfeld v. So. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). Thus, the older
protectionism was removed as an issue between labor and the women’s movement.
174. California Fed. Sav. & L., 479 U.S. at 297 (White, J., dissenting ).
175. Id. at 295 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment only).
176. Id. at 284-86.
177. Id. at 289 (citing G.E. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added)). See also Newport News v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678-79 n.17 (1973)
(acknowledging that the PDA incorporated the position of the dissent in Gilbert).
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In an alternative holding (or perhaps dicta), the Court also seemingly
adopted the NOW position: Even if preferential policies were not
permitted, the PDA still did not preempt California’s law.178 The state did
not compel employers to treat women workers better than men. Rather, it
established the standard for pregnancy disability leaves. Employers were
free to match that with comparable disability benefits for all, thus
simultaneously satisfying the state and the federal statutes. Without any
necessary conflict between the mandates of the two laws, there also would
be no preemption by the PDA.179
The same women’s, civil rights, and labor interests that supported the
result in Guerra, quickly united in a major legislative campaign to finesse
the pregnancy and special treatment conundrum, through a gender neutral
solution called the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Introduced
in April of 1986, the proposal “sped through hearings” in the House, where
it garnered more than 100 co-sponsors. As Donna Lenhoff, Associate
Director of the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, explained, the proposal was
intended to be “a significant first step toward a national policy to encourage
the
accommodation
of
workplaces
to
employees’
family
responsibilities.”180 Since women bore the brunt of that burden in most
families, they had the most to lose from the absence of such
accommodations, and the most to gain from a new approach.181 Despite the
broad-based support, however, the FMLA was not enacted until 1993.182
The legislation was passed by Congress twice, only to be vetoed by the first
President Bush.183 With the election of President William J. Clinton (in
part based on a noted “gender gap” in voting patterns),184 however, the
threat of veto was removed, and the FMLA of 1993 passed.185 It requires
178. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 479 U.S. at 290-92.
179. Id.
180. Lehnoff, supra note 169. The FMLA was originally introduced in Congress in
1985 by Patricia Schroeder. See, Judith Elder, Pregnant in the Marketplace: Legal Rights of
Pregnant Women, Mothers and Fathers,” Mothering, Sept. 22, 1989, 53 at 86.
181. Lenhoff, supra note 169.
182. In 1988 a different version of the bill died when supporters could not break an
“election-eve” filibuster; the legislation was reintroduced in 1989 with the support of 130
House co-sponsors; and 150 national children’s family, health, labor and business groups.
Tamara Henry, Family leave bill reintroduced, United Press International Feb. 2, 1989.
Among the major industrialized nations at the time, only the United States and South Africa
lacked nationally mandated maternity-leave benefits. France, Canada, West Germany, Italy
and Japan, all mandated paid parental or maternity leave at 60 percent to 100 percent normal
salary. Andrea Herman, ABA Backs Parental Leave Bill, 75 A.B.J. 123 (1989).
183. Michelle Ruess, Family-Leave Details Uncertain for ‘93, Plain Dealer, Nov. 28,
1992 at 4a. In an election speech in 1992, Bush said that he believed it would lead to
discrimination against women; Bush and Family Leave: Makes Pitch to Working Women,
The Hotline, Sept. 21, 1992.
184. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Women’s Day, 1992 Election, 255 THE NATION 17, 17
(Nov. 1992) (celebrating the 11 point gender gap in voting in favor of Bill Clinton, and the
accession of four new women Senators and a near doubling of female Representatives).
185. After the second election of George W. Bush,, however, new threats to the
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covered employers to give all employees up to 12 weeks unpaid leave after
the birth or adoption of a child, or for their own or a family member’s
(spouse, child, parent) serious health condition.186
The neutrality approach of the FMLA was subsequently upheld in
Nevada v. Hibbs187 by a divided Supreme Court as an exercise of
Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in order to
prevent discrimination on the grounds of sex. Interestingly, Justice
Rehnquist, who has never been happy with heightened judicial scrutiny for
sex based classifications,188 nonetheless wrote an opinion for the majority
relying on that framework.189 He cited the findings of Congress that
“[h]istorically, denial or curtailment of women’s employment opportunities
has been traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that women are
mothers first, and workers second. This prevailing ideology about
women’s roles has in turn justified discrimination against women when
they are mothers or mothers-to-be.”190 Conversely, Congress found that
stereotypes about men’s “lack of domestic responsibilities” help close the
“self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced stereotypical views about
women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.” By virtue of
its neutrality, the statutory remedy attacked both unfortunate stereotypes:
since all employees enjoyed the benefit, employers could no longer single
out women as “an inordinate drain on the workplace,” that can be avoided
by hiring only men.191
By contrast to the Phillips Title VII result, the FMLA incorporates a
FMLA have emerged. The United States Chamber of Commerce wants significant revisions
in light of what it insists is havoc in the workplace. See Bradford Plumer, Business Groups
are trying to restrict the Family and Medical Leave Act. That’s precisely the wrong
approach, MOTHER JONES, June 7, 2005, http://www.motherjones.com/
commentary/columns/2005/06/FMLA.html. Meanwhile, proponents seek expansion of
FMLA provisions, either through collective bargaining or revisions in the law.
186. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(c) (2005). In the 18
months between 1999-2000, nearly 24 million Americans took leave for FMLA covered
reasons. Employees often had to resort to unpaid FMLA leave because their employers do
not offer sick leave or disability pay. See Stephanie Armour, Family Medical Leave Act at
Center of Hot Debate, USA TODAY, May 26, 2005, at 1B.
187. Nevada v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
188. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (questioning the appropriateness of the “substantially motivated by an important
governmental purpose” intermediate standard for gender-based classifications).
189. Hibbs, 538 U.S at 724. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas dissented. Id. at
743 (Scalia, J., dissenting), & at 744 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 736. The appeal to the history of sex discrimination was pursued in an
amicus brief by a virtual honor roll of women’s historians. See, Brief for Women’s History
Scholars Alice Kessler, Harris, Linda Kerber, et al. Supporting Respondents, Nevada
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (No. 01-1368). The amici demonstrated a long history
of gender stereotyping that “family care is primarily women’s work and is women’s primary
responsibility” and of intentional discrimination by the state in leave policies for its
own employees and in legislation that restricted women’s employment opportunities. Id. at
pp. 1-2.
191. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736-37.

OREN - FOR CHRISTENSEN

Summer 2006]

4/12/2006 9:46 AM

HONOR THY MOTHER?

215

different kind of neutrality. It provides an affirmative remedy that does not
single women out and thus in theory does not penalize them for their
greater caring responsibilities. In the absence of a cultural change that
would encourage men to utilize the FMLA in significant numbers,
however, women still will bear the brunt of the disruptions in work force
participation along with the resulting economic penalties.
The same concern about lopsided incentives that fueled the FMLA
proposal, and an additional fear of spillover effects on health and safety in
the workplace, had already sparked a campaign by women’s and labor
organizations in opposition to corporate “fetal protection” exclusionary
policies.192 In the late 1970s, lead and chemical companies, which had
recently come under pressure to open higher-paid jobs on the shop floor to
women, suddenly discovered a concern for the potential fetuses of their
female employees. They promulgated policies that banned all women who
could not demonstrate that they were surgically sterile from working in
departments where they would be exposed to lead or other dangerous
substances.193 One of the five women who agreed to sterilization in order
to retain higher-paying jobs at American Cyanamid’s Willow Island plant
later said “[b]ut I don’t think it’s right that a company can tell you to do a
thing like this to keep your job. I did it because I was scared and I had to
have the income.”194
Having failed in initial efforts to use OSHA law or joint agency
regulations to address the problem,195 the coalition turned to Title VII and
sex discrimination law. Ultimately, the issue came before the Supreme
Court in a case called UAW v. Johnson Controls.196 The result was a
significant victory for neutrality principles, as a bulwark against both sex
discrimination and degradation of the work environment. The Court ruled
that the exclusionary policies were not justified because the safety of third
persons, i.e. the potential fetuses, did not constitute a BFOQ sufficient to
excuse policies that were based on sex discrimination on their face. There
was no BFOQ because the ability to become pregnant has nothing to do
with an employee’s ability to perform the essence of the job.197 Therefore,
Justice Blackmun opined, the woman herself must decide the relative
importance of her economic and reproductive roles, and therefore what
risks she is willing to take in the workplace.198
192. See Oren, Protection, supra note 145, at 351 (discussing establishment of the
Coalition for Reproductive Rights of Workers (CRROW) after story of coerced
sterilizations to keep jobs at American Cyanamid’s Willow Island Plant broke).
193. Id. at 340-42.
194. Id. at 349 (citing Bill Richards, “Women Say They Had to be Sterilized to Hold
Jobs,” WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1979, at A1).
195. Id. at 352-62.
196. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
197. Id. at 206.
198. Id.
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Some critics decried the result in Johnson Controls as an ironic
instance of women winning the right to work in an equally dangerous
workplace as men.199 Whatever the practical results may have been,
especially in an increasingly conservative political and regulatory climate
after the 1980s, the decision was necessary, both for sex discrimination and
for occupational health and safety law. Without it, the BFOQ defense to
sex discrimination in Title VII would have been diluted beyond a narrow
focus on a quality that cut to the essence of the business, such as wetnursing. Such a ruling would have reopened an enormous gap in civil
rights protection against discriminatory treatment of women in the work
place in the name of protection of their capacity for motherhood.
Furthermore, the labor agenda of changing the workplace, not the
worker,200 also would be compromised. Instead of adhering to stricter lead
standards and environmental controls, companies could simply remove
those workers they claimed to be more vulnerable,201 and let poor working
conditions ride. Understood properly, through a double lens of sex and
class, even if it did not guarantee success, the Johnson Controls neutrality
decision was critical to progress on either front.202
From Muller v. Oregon in 1908 to Nevada v. Hibbs in 2003, the story
of motherhood in the work place reads like “progress” toward neutrality
and the acknowledgement of the value of women workers.203 In today’s
world, moms clearly are in the work force to stay. In 2002, about threefifths of women were paid wage-earners. This included 72 percent of
women with children under 18, and 61 percent of women with children
under the age of 3.204 It is legally unacceptable to exclude women workers
199. See, e.g., Ruth Rosen, What Feminist Victory in the Court? N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1991, at A17. See also, Linda Greenhouse, “Court Backs Right of Women to Jobs With
Health Risks,” N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at A1, B12.
200. See Oren, Protection, supra note 145, at 346-47 (citing, “Informal Public
Hearing on Proposed Standard for Exposure to Lead, United States Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration,” Mar. 16, 1977, at 679 [Lead Standard
Hearings] at 1144 (testimony of Olga Madar).
201. The companies seemed unconcerned about the reproductive vulnerabilities of
male workers, and even male union officials had to be persuaded to think outside of the
fetus-equals-motherhood box and to consider the role of men in reproduction. See, Oren,
Protection, supra note 145, at 345.
202. But see Elaine Draper, Reproductive Hazards and Fetal Exclusion Policies
After Johnson Controls, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 117, 120-25 (2001) (arguing that
corporate exclusion policies changed less after the Supreme Court’s decision than would be
expected).
203. See, e.g., Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 636 (“mother’s insurance benefits” for
surviving wives of insured men, but none for surviving husbands of deceased women
workers who were raising children, violated equal protection); Califano, 443 U.S. at 76
(state law permitting AFDC payments to dependent children whose fathers were
unemployed, but denying those benefits if their mothers were unemployed is
unconstitutional).
204. Women at Work: A Visual Essay, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Oct. 2003, at 45,
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2003/10/ressum3.pdf.
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because they are mothers, or have the capacity to become mothers. That
certainly is a positive development. The Court, however, has not said that
it requires an accommodation to women’s “differing roles in the scheme of
human existence.”205 For example, it upheld a Missouri statute which
even-handedly excluded from unemployment benefits all claimants who
“voluntarily” leave their jobs “for a reason not causally connected to their
work,” including pregnancy.206 Neutrality alone, moreover, cannot provide
a true social solution for women who wish to combine motherhood with
employment. We are still left largely to our own devices. FMLA leave is
unpaid,207 and it is unlikely that women workers, who are typically lower
paid than men,208 will stay in the workforce while fathers stay home.
Unlike in other western industrialized countries, there is no corporate
crèche system or tax-supported quality day care that shifts some of the
burden to society as a whole instead of resting it on individual families.209
205. Cf. G.E. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 139 (pre-PDA ruling that Title VII does not
require employers to accommodate a pregnant worker and that the classification was not
gender-based). But see Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (post-PDA case
permitting state to require maternity leave policies without finding pre-emption by Title
VII). For a similar debate over New Jersey’s anti-discrimination statute, see Gerety v.
Atlantic City Hilton Casino Resort, 184 N.J. 391, 877 A.2d 1233 (N.J. 2005) (upholding 26week disability policy even though it did not cover the full term of a pregnancy related
disability). The New Jersey Supreme Court held that even though “it goes without saying
that only women get pregnant” and that discrimination because of pregnancy is unlawful, no
special accommodation is required, so long as there is any uniquely male disability that
potentially lasts more than 26 weeks and also would not be fully covered. Id. at 403-04.
206. Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Comm’n of Mo., 479 U.S. 511, 512
(1987).
207. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(c) (2005). Even in its
current form, the FMLA is under attack. See Congresswoman Tubbs Jones Signs Letter
Urging Bush Administration Against Changes to Family Medical Leave Act, PR NEWSWIRE,
Apr. 4, 2005 (Tubbs and other Democrats sent letter to Department of Labor which is
currently considering proposals to roll back many of the protections of the FMLA, by
changing the definition of a “serious health condition” and restricting the use of intermittent
leave to care for a family member.) Congresswoman Tubbs is also an original co-sponsor of
a bill to extend coverage of the FMLA to more categories of family members.
Critics have stated that 45 percent of American workers are not covered by family
leave laws. More than half of workers who need leave do not take it because they cannot
afford it. Only 2 percent of private sector employees are eligible for paid family leave.
Meanwhile, more and more mothers of young children are in the workforce, and
responsibilities for older family members are growing. Steve Idemoto, Family Leave
Insurance: A Proposal for Washington Workers, http://www.econop.org/FLIPolicyBrief2000-IntroContextProblem.htm#Context (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
208. Although there were significant variations by age and racial category, median
weekly earnings for full time U.S. women workers in 2003 were 80 percent of men’s, up
from 78 percent in 2002, and from 63 percent in 1979. HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS
IN 2003, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR STATISTICS 2004, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom
2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). Serious occupational segregation, which contribute to
earnings disparities, persists.
209. See Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall
Case, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 365, 379 (2004), (citing Janet C. Gornick & Marcia K. Meyers,
Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment (2004)
(describing policy differences between Europe and the U.S.). “France, for example, makes
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Moreover, employment decisions can never be “neutral” in the absence of a
universal health care system.210 The extraordinary growth of women’s
employment has taken place predominantly in the service sector that is
notorious for its lack of benefits.211 Again, this makes it more likely that
women have a tenuous hold on the workforce, especially when they
become mothers. On top of these considerations, employers, and perhaps
families themselves, have to be convinced that it is as legitimate for a
father to require accommodation of his family role as it is for a mother.212
one-stop education, medical care, and psychiatric care available through a subsidized system
of neighborhood child care centers. These programs are viewed as so important for
children’s social development that parents fight to get their children into them.” Joan C.
Williams & Shauna L. Shames, Mothers’ Dreams: Abortion and the High Price of
Motherhood, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 818, 829 (2004). See also Harry Gee, New Paradigms of
Criminal Justice for the Twenty-First Century, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 29, 55 (2000) (citing
Elliott Currie, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1998) at 158 (describing how child care
for 3- to 5-year-olds is nearly universal in Europe; and Sweden has subsidized pre-school
day care at child care centers).
210. Although European social health programs have undergone some recent
changes, they still remain cornerstones of the welfare state. See, e.g., Hans Maarse, Aggie
Paulus, Has Solidarity Survived? A Comparative Analysis of the Effect of Social Health
Insurance Reform in Four European Countries, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 585 (2003);
Robert F. Rich, Health Policy, Health Insurance And The Social Contract, 21 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL’Y J. 397 (2000).
211. Bill Moyers, Politics and Economy, Downward Mobility; Questions and
Answers with Beth Shulman, Oct. 24, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/now/politics /wagesqanda.
html (stating that the largest projected growth in the United States economy over the next
ten year is in low wage industries where women predominate and that women often accept
sacrifices in wages and benefits in order to gain flexibility to fulfill family responsibilities).
Shulman is the author of THE BETRAYAL OF WORK: HOW LOW-WAGE JOBS FAIL 30 MILLION
AMERICANS. See also Jay M. Berman, Industry Output & Employment Projections to 2012,
127 MONTHLY. LAB. REV. 58 (2004) (predicting that almost all the projected growth through
2012 will be in the service economy).
212. As the daughter of a mother who needs care, I recognize that stereotyped
expectations are deeply embedded in all our family relationships (including my own) and
are practically unavoidable. If you want to see the doctor, you must be available at all
hours, on their schedule. If you have an elderly mother who cannot reliably report her
history, what choice is there but to accede? If you want to avoid the inevitable mishaps of
communication and care of a seriously ill individual that occur with each change of shift or
change of facility, you must be personally present to protect someone who is unable to
defend herself. It is an unusual son indeed who takes personal responsibility; and an elderly
mother even may prefer help from her daughter. As my mother says, “thank god for a
daughter.” When I say, “you could rent one,” teasingly, she says seriously, “no, no one
would do this except a daughter,” and there are times that she only responds to the comfort
of her daughter. I can read to her or talk about family and sometimes break the cycle of
preoccupation with physical suffering that has her begging for someone to help. Am I
supposed to turn my back on that? What kind of institutionalized social support is there
when one is 60, working full-time, and taking care of an elderly mother (and has
responsibilities for other family members)? Section 661.201 of the Texas Government
Code provides for accumulated paid sick leave, but it may only be used to care for someone
who both resides in the same household and is related by kinship, adoption, marriage, or is
in foster care. An employee’s use of sick leave for family members who do not live in the
household “is strictly limited to the time necessary to provide care and assistance to a
spouse, child, or parent of the employee who needs such assistance as a direct result of a
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While some mothers are presumed to care, and others apparently must
be coerced to care satisfactorily, working mothers are welcome to remain
in the workforce, but only so long as they keep their caring from interfering
too much.

IV. NON-MOTHERHOOD: THE RIGHT TO REFUSE OR
CHOOSE TO BE A MOTHER
The abortion cases constitute the last aspect of “motherhood”
contemplated by the Supreme Court. In the late 1960s, feminists active in
women’s liberation groups identified the personal as political and began to
demand the right to refuse the significant physical risks and personal
consequences of carrying a pregnancy to term. In 1969, for example, a
radical feminist group called the Redstockings stormed legislative hearings
considering abortion law reform proposals in New York State.213 The
hearings had scheduled testimony from 14 male professionals and one nun.
Excluded from the hearings, the Redstockings held their own public
proceedings, claiming, “We are the experts, the only experts, we who’ve
had abortions.” After this speak-out, attorneys Florynce Kennedy and
Diane Schulder, supported by a coalition of women’s liberation
organizations, brought a federal case challenging New York’s existing
laws, and prepared to put on what they called “the women’s case” in
addition to the “doctors’ case” and the “experts’ case.”214 The lawsuit was
declared moot after the New York legislature passed the nation’s first
reformed abortion law, which went into effect July 1, 1970.215 That timid
measure, however, did not satisfy the likes of Kennedy and Schulder, who
saw the abortion issue “as the vanguard of attack against the oppressive
police and government actions, for a declaration of women’s rights to
control their own bodies and destinies.”216 The activist attorneys were also
well aware of the economic barriers to women’s health, and the racism that

documented medical condition. For the purpose of this policy, parent does not cover
parents-in-law of the employee.” University of Houston, Vacation and Sick Leave (Oct. 8,
2004), http://www.uhsa.uh.edu/sam/AM/Am_02d01.htm.
213. DIANA SCHULDER & FLORYNCE KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP: TESTIMONY BY
WOMEN WHO HAVE SUFFERED THE CONSEQUENCES OF RESTRICTIVE ABORTION LAWS 3-4
(1971).
214. The case was styled Abramowicz v. Lefkowitz, (consolidated with three other
cases). Id. at 91-95. The litigation planning was coordinated with women’s liberation
activists, including the Women’s Health Collective; the Women’s Abortion Project and
other members of a coalition. Id.
215. Id. at 178. The statute still outlawed abortions after 24 weeks of pregnancy,
unless they were necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman. Id. After enactment
of the law, from mid-1970 through 1972, nearly 350,000 women left their home states to get
safe and legal abortions in New York. SARAH WEDDINGTON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE 15
(1992).
216. SCHULDER & KENNEDY, supra note 213, at 186.
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characterized some components of the abortion rights movement.217
Meanwhile, in Austin, Texas, Sarah Weddington joined a group at the
University of Texas interested in women’s health issues,218 that later began
to make abortion referrals.219 The members were concerned about their
legal position, leading Weddington to file the famous Roe v. Wade lawsuit
in 1970 when she was a young lawyer.220 Since 1973, when Roe’s
somewhat startling victory was pronounced, the course of the right to
refuse to be a mother has not run smoothly, either in Court, or in the streets.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore all the ins and outs of the
vast body of abortion jurisprudence. But it is worth looking at a few
critical cases to see what the Court had to say specifically about
motherhood and its physical and social implications. In Roe v. Wade,221 for
example, the anonymous Norma McCorvey alleged “that she was
unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy by an
abortion ‘performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe,
clinical conditions’; that she was unable to get a ‘legal’ abortion in Texas
because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction in
order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions.”222
The case, and the abortion controversy that persists until today, focused
in part on the history of abortion in the common law, and the philosophy of
the derivation of constitutionally protected interests such as “the right to
privacy.” Justice Blackmun’s opinion, however, also has something to say
about the physical and social consequences of motherhood. He wrote that
motherhood by virtue of a state law that denied choice could involve
“[s]pecific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy.”223
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
217. Id. at 153-61. The Right to Choose coalition in Rochester New York in the
years immediately preceding the 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade included the
local chapter of Zero Population Growth. ZPG later became associated nationally with a
right-wing anti-immigrant platform.
218. The Austin self-help group was inspired by the now-classic OUR BODIES
OURSELVES, which the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective published and which sold
a phenomenal 200,000 copies in a newsprint edition put out by a nonprofit press in 1971,
before being published by a commercial press in 1973. Between 1971 and 1976 it sold
more than 850,000 copies.
CSAH, An Outline of American History,
http://www.americanhistory.or.kr/book/files/etwelve06.html#1212, (2002).
219. WEDDINGTON, supra note 215, at 28–34.
220. Id. at 44-56. Norma McCorvey, who was the anonymous plaintiff “Roe,”
subsequently became an anti-choice activist. In February of 2005, her effort to have the
Supreme Court reopen the case named for her was rejected. Supreme Court declines to
reopen abortion decision, McCorvey v. Hill, No. 04-967 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2005), HOSPITAL
LITIGATION RPTR., Mar. 2005, at p.5.
221. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
222. Id. at 120.
223. Id. at 153.
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distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically
and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
All these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily
will consider in consultation.224
On its part, the State possessed important interests in safeguarding the
health of the pregnant woman “in maintaining medical standards, and in
protecting potential life.”225 In other words, women had their interest in
making choices about a condition with potentially serious physical and
social sequellae. The State had its interest in regulating those choices up to
a point. The trimester approach of Roe, since repudiated by the Supreme
Court, gave more weight to the State’s interest in protecting maternal
health in the second trimester; and only allowed its interest in potential life
to trump the woman’s choices in the last trimester of pregnancy.226
Justice Blackmun’s framework came under attack and finally fell apart
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.227 In a
decision notable for its length and dueling opinions, Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter held the balance of power that prevented a total
debacle for the right to refuse to continue a pregnancy.228 While rejecting
the trimester approach as unworkable, the joint opinion acknowledged that
women enjoy a liberty interest in the decision to terminate a pregnancy.229
The Justices saw abortion as a unique act “fraught with consequences” for
all concerned, including the woman “who must live with the implications
of her decision.” The State, however, had a limited ability to regulate the
conduct “because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to
the human condition and so unique to the law.”
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices
have from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a
pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond
of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the
sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist,
without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant
224. Id.
225. Id. at 154.
226. Id. at 163-64.
227. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
228. Id. at 843-44 (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., announcing the judgment of
the Court, and delivering an opinion with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI, and an
opinion with respect to Part V-E, in which Justice Stevens joins, and an opinion with respect
to Parts IV, V-B, and V-D).
229. Id. at 852 (Joint Opinion).
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that vision has been in the course of our history and culture. The destiny of
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her
spiritual imperatives and her place in society.230
The State’s interests, however, were not insubstantial, and the Casey
swing opinion drew the line at a new place called “viability.” Pre-viability,
the State could enact all kinds of regulations, so long as they did not have
the purpose or effect of imposing an “undue burden” on the woman’s
autonomous choice.231 Post-viability, the State’s interest in protecting
potential life could actually prevail over the woman’s interests, unless there
was a threat to her life or health.232
Interestingly, the new conservative-moderate team of Justices balked at
Pennsylvania’s laws of spousal notification. The Court was very impressed
230. Id.
231. Id. at 877-78.
232. Id. at 879. The landscape of abortion jurisprudence changed with Casey, with
many more regulations passing muster. See Brent Weinstein, The State’s Constitutional
Power to Regulate Abortion, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 229 (2004); Lisa Shaw Roy,
Roe and the New Frontier, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 339 (2003).
The Allan Guttmacher Institute tracks legislation introduced in all the states and by
Congress. The restrictions it reports include the following: mandatory counseling and
waiting periods for abortion in at least 22 states (found at http://www.guttmacher.org
/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWRA.pdf.); 32 states which require some parental involvement in
a minor’s decision to have an abortion (http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_PIMA.pdf); 46 states which require hospitals, facilities and physicians providing
abortions to submit regular and confidential reports to the state (http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_ARR.pdf). A variety of “conscience clauses” permit health care
providers in 46 states to refuse to provide abortion services; in 12 states providers may
refuse contraceptive services too; and in 17 states they may decline to provide sterilization
services. The Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, Refusing To Provide Health
Services 1 (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf.
The sad necessity for post-viability abortions inspired heated controversy over what
has inaccurately been called the “partial-birth” abortion technique. The Supreme Court
invalidated a Nebraska law because it lacked an exception for preserving the pregnant
woman’s health. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). However, many other such
bans, with varying conditions which may or may not be constitutional, remain on the books.
See The Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, Bans On Partial-Birth Abortion (Feb.
1, 2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_BPBA.pdf. There are 5 states
with a post-viability ban, but the two of them which lack a health exception are
unenforceable in light of Stenberg. Of four states with a health exception, two are broad and
two are very narrow. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia limit post-viability
abortions, but include the health exception required by Supreme Court jurisprudence. The
Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, Restrictions on Postviability Abortions (Feb. 1,
2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPA.
Congress has passed a federal ban on partial birth abortions (also with no health
exception) (the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2005)), which the
Eighth Circuit held unconstitutional in July of 2005. See Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791
(8th Cir. 2005). Certiorari has been granted by the United States Supreme Court, Gonzales
v. Carhart, 2006 WL 385614 (2006), which will hear it in its reconfigured shape. The late
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor have been
replaced by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito, respectively.
Justice O’Connor provided a critical swing vote on abortion cases, while Justice Alito is
widely feared to have a much less open mind.
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with the evidence of serious domestic violence in families, and wished to
repudiate an outdated gender-determined view of the proper roles in homes
and families. It cited everything from Bradwell v. State, in which a married
woman was unable to gain admission to the state bar of Illinois, to other
decisions insisting “woman is still regarded as the center of home and
family life, with attendant ‘special responsibilities that precluded full and
independent legal status under the Constitution.’”233 But this common law
notion of a “woman’s role within the family” was no longer acceptable, and
consequently a husband had no right to interfere in his wife’s exercise of
her constitutionally protected liberty interest.234
Contrast to the above, Justice Blackmun’s impassioned defense of his
original decision.235 His argument was more explicit in dissent in Casey
than it had been in the original Roe opinion, about what was at stake for
women if they lost the right to refuse to continue a pregnancy. The risks
included infringement “upon a woman’s right to bodily integrity by
imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of physical
harm. During pregnancy, women experience dramatic physical changes
and a wide range of health consequences. Labor and delivery pose
additional health risks and physical demands.”236 In other words,
continuation of pregnancy meant serious intrusion on the bodily integrity of
the woman. The woman denied the right to refuse also lost the ability to
make her own autonomous decisions about reproduction and family
planning — “critical life choices that that Court long has deemed central to
the right to privacy.”237 Motherhood affects “woman’s educational
prospects, employment opportunities, and self-determination,” so to deny
her choice in this sphere is to “deprive her of basic control over her life.”238
Moreover, forced motherhood has gender implications: “The State
conscripts women’s bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide
years of maternal care, “all without compensation from the State for their
services. Instead, the dissent continued, it is assumed that motherhood is
“natural” for women.239 Justice Blackmun also questioned the bona fides
of the asserted State interest in “maternal health,” which it seemed to him
to focus only on making women feel maternal.240
Motherhood as risk and burden justified a woman’s claim to make her
own decisions whether to be or not to be a mother. The state’s interest in
233. Id. at 897.
234. Id. at 897-98.
235. Id. at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
236. Id. at 927.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 928.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 941.
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compelling the completion of the pregnancy, by contrast, focused on the
fetus, on the “potential life” that would be snuffed out by the woman’s
choice not to be a mother. A funny thing happened on the way to the
Court’s abortion decisions.
The Women’s Liberation demand for
promotion of women’s health seems to have taken a back seat, except as a
paradoxical justification to impose deliberately discouraging restrictions on
women’s choices. Thus, when it came to coverage by public programs for
safe, healthy abortions for indigent women, the Court simply was not
interested. First, it ruled that Medicaid had no obligation to finance nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women, even though it did provide
benefits for childbirth.241 Then it upheld a very restrictive version of the
Hyde Amendment, in which Congress prohibited the use of any federal
funds to reimburse the cost of even medically-indicated abortions under the
joint federal/state Medicaid program, except for very narrow
circumstances.242 Both of these decisions were based on the jurisprudential
position that while government may not actively prohibit choices, it has no
obligation to affirmatively support them. In other words, the interest of a
poor woman wishing to protect her health during an unwanted pregnancy is
not of equal constitutional weight with her theoretical “freedom of choice.”
She was poor before she got pregnant; she remains poor; and, if the public
authorities prefer to spend their money on childbirth rather than abortions,
she is left to her own devices. This strict “you’re on your own” approach
extended not just to elective non-therapeutic abortions, but even to those
that were “medically necessary” (so long as the woman’s life itself was not
at risk).243
There are many reasons that the abortion finance cases were decided as
they were, but they also demonstrate the limits of the Court’s views of
motherhood. Majorities on the Court admitted that motherhood that was
not freely chosen was an enormous imposition on the physical integrity and
life opportunities of the women who were deprived of the ability to choose
or refuse. They also acknowledged that poverty could deprive women of
their choices as effectively as any state law did. But the support for healthy
motherhood, or healthy non-motherhood, is as absent from the Court’s
decisions as it often is in public policy. While the state may “favor”
childbirth with its policies, it is not required by virtue of the Constitution to
241. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
242. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
243. For a survey of funding restrictions see The Guttmacher Institute, State Policies
in Brief, State Funding of Abortion Under Medicaid, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter
/spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf; restrictions on state family planning funding for abortion counseling
and referral, The Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, State Family Planning
Funding Restrictions, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SFPFR.pdf. Some
states even prohibit private insurers from covering abortion services except in cases of life
endangerment. The Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, Restricting Insurance
Coverage of Abortion, http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RICA.pdf.
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provide resources to support healthful autonomous choices about
motherhood.

V. CONCLUSION: HONOR THY MOTHER?
The Court’s views about “motherhood” must be teased out from
holdings in four apparently disconnected areas and from decisions that may
be oblique or obscure. Worse still, the Court relies on generic assumptions
that fail to reflect how complicated an undertaking it is to be a mother in
this society, and how much that experience is shaped by all facets of a
woman’s life, including her age, her class, her race, her marital status and
familial resources, and the expectations of others and of herself. Despite
some decided improvements, like the FMLA, and in the face of the profamily and pro-marriage rhetoric of the Bush administration, there is in fact
very little social support either for motherhood, or for its complement,
refusing motherhood.
When compared to unmarried fathers, biology is destiny for mothers,
who are presumed to be “caring” in a way that fathers have to establish by
“stepping forward.” But for those mothers who become dependent on the
largesse of the state, the presumption shifts: it is no longer acceptable for
them to be paid to stay at home and raise children. Rather, they are objects
of suspicion and coercion who must be pushed into the labor force in short
order. Working mothers, on the other hand, are respectable. They earn this
status, however, largely insofar as they can conform to a neutral role in the
workplace. The Court was not even willing to recognize pregnancy
discrimination in employment as a species of illegal treatment on the
grounds of sex until it was reversed by Congress in the PDA. The Court
approved California’s maternity leave policy, but subsequent gender
neutral federal legislation mooted that divisive opinion. It has never clearly
ruled that accommodations may be necessary in order for women to
participate in the normal scheme of workplace activities. Finally, in its
abortion decisions, the Court has significantly retreated from its pioneering
Roe v. Wade decision about the right to refuse to become a mother. Indeed,
with the retirement of Justice O’Connor who so often provided a critical
swing vote and her replacement by Justice Samuel Alito, women’s liberties
in this area hang by a thread. In any case, the abortion rights cases never
included a real dedication to the promotion of women’s health, either as
mothers or as non-mothers, respectively. Indigent women are on their own
in procuring the resources necessary to make a safe decision.
When Shulamith Firestone first published “The Dialectic of Sex” in
1970, she offered a shocking argument: Just as the struggle over the means
of production was the key to class inequality, women must seize control
over the means of reproduction if they wanted to be free of sex
discrimination.
This included the potential for entirely artificial
reproduction whereby children would not have to be produced in the

OREN - FOR CHRISTENSEN

226

4/12/2006 9:46 AM

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17.2

physical wombs of their biological mothers, or of any other woman.
Firestone argued that only in this way would female dependence on males
be avoided and “the tyranny of the biological family . . . be broken,” along
with the “psychology of power.” She warned, however, that the “new
technology, especially fertility control, may be used against them to
reinforce the entrenched system of exploitation.”
Firestone’s Orwellian vision has come true in part, as there is a new
technology that separates the biology of fertilization and genetics entirely
from gestation in a particular womb mother’s body. However, it does not
remove the necessity of pregnancy or really change the experience of
motherhood for most women. Even if women wished to be, they are not
“free” of the “tyranny of the biological family.” More importantly, they
are not free of the tyranny of the social attitudes and stereotypes that under
gird the Supreme Court’s views on “motherhood.” The Court has
constructed “Motherhood” with a capital “M,” but without Honor. It
remains enormously difficult to be a mother in our society. Ask any
mother who has no choice about doing most of the caring; ask any
dependent mother who has to swallow the insults of the State in order to
feed her children; ask any working mother who is underpaid and who has
to pretend not to be a mother in order to succeed in the workplace, or,
alternatively, has to compromise her working life; ask any woman who is
subjected to harassment by society instead of support for her choices in
making a healthy abortion decision. The current political and legal
environment makes it hard to believe in the potential for radical change, so
let us at least get back to basics: “Honor Thy Mother.” Honor the right of
every woman to be an autonomous, self-directing, healthy individual who
enjoys physical and social support for choosing a very valuable role, or for
refusing it safely and with dignity and respect.

